A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang Hyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism becomes equivalent to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) in which the winners are chosen simultaneously.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)357-359
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume125
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Dec 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this