A stackelberg game approach in an integrated inventory model with carbon-emission and setup cost reduction

Biswajit Sarkar, Sharmila Saren, Mitali Sarkar, Yong Won Seo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper formulates an integrated inventory model that allows Stackelberg game policy for optimizing joint total cost of a vendor and buyer system. After receiving the lot, the buyer commences an inspection process to determine the defective items. All defective items the buyer sends to vendor during the receiving of the next lot. Due to increasing number of shipments fixed and variable transportation, as well as carbon emissions, are considered, which makes the model sustainable integrated model forever. To reduce the setup cost for the vendor, a discrete setup reduction is considered for maximization more profit. The players of the integrated model are with unequal power (as leader and follower) and the Stackelberg game strategy is utilized to solve this model for obtaining global optimum solution over the finite planning horizon. An illustrative numerical example is given to understand this model clearly.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1244
JournalSustainability (Switzerland)
Volume8
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Jan 1

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cost reduction
carbon emission
Cost reduction
Carbon
profit maximization
follower
costs
cost
Costs
Profitability
Inspection
leader
Planning
planning

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

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A stackelberg game approach in an integrated inventory model with carbon-emission and setup cost reduction. / Sarkar, Biswajit; Saren, Sharmila; Sarkar, Mitali; Seo, Yong Won.

In: Sustainability (Switzerland), Vol. 8, No. 12, 1244, 01.01.2016.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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