A theory of patent portfolios

Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of patent portfolios in which firms accumulate an enormous amount of related patents, which makes it impractical to develop new products that avoid inadvertent infringement. We show that patent peace arises if product market competition is weak and patent portfolios are either sufficiently weak or sufficiently strong with comparable size. An increase in one firm's patent portfolio reduces the innovation incentives of its rivals but does not necessarily increase its own. Firms with larger patent portfolios have stronger incentives to acquire additional patents, while consumers may be better offif firms with weaker portfolios acquire them.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)315-351
Number of pages37
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jan 1

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Patent portfolio
Patents
Incentives
Innovation
Peace
Product market competition
New products
Infringement

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Choi, Jay Pil ; Gerlach, Heiko. / A theory of patent portfolios. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2017 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 315-351.
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A theory of patent portfolios. / Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko.

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 01.01.2017, p. 315-351.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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