Accountability, Political Views, and Bureaucratic Behavior: A Theoretical Approach

Sangyub Ryu, Yongjin Chang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This study has developed a theoretical framework to predict bureaucratic behaviors with career public officials’ political views (whether career public officials agree or disagree with their overhead political principals’ ideology) and bureaucratic accountability (accountability either to the overhead political principals or to the public sentiment) by adopting and extending Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty model. Given the two conditions, this study has drawn four propositions of possible bureaucratic responses: loyalty; voice; exit; and silence. In addition, the stay scenario is discussed for passive bureaucrats regardless of the two dimensions. By incorporating relevant examples with the propositions, this study expects to contribute to a better understanding of bureaucratic behavior.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)481-494
Number of pages14
JournalPublic Organization Review
Volume17
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Dec 1

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loyalty
career
study conditions
responsibility
ideology
scenario
Accountability
Exit
Loyalty

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Law

Cite this

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Accountability, Political Views, and Bureaucratic Behavior : A Theoretical Approach. / Ryu, Sangyub; Chang, Yongjin.

In: Public Organization Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, 01.12.2017, p. 481-494.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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