This study has developed a theoretical framework to predict bureaucratic behaviors with career public officials’ political views (whether career public officials agree or disagree with their overhead political principals’ ideology) and bureaucratic accountability (accountability either to the overhead political principals or to the public sentiment) by adopting and extending Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty model. Given the two conditions, this study has drawn four propositions of possible bureaucratic responses: loyalty; voice; exit; and silence. In addition, the stay scenario is discussed for passive bureaucrats regardless of the two dimensions. By incorporating relevant examples with the propositions, this study expects to contribute to a better understanding of bureaucratic behavior.
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Acknowledgements We thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their constructive comments. We also appreciate Dr. Beryl Radin and Dr. Andy Whitford for their insightful comments. The earlier versions of this work were presented at International Research Society for Public Management Conference and KAPA International Conference in 2015. This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund and International University of Japan Research Fund.
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)