Adaptive governance, status quo bias, and political competition: Why the sharing economy is welcome in some cities but not in others

Sounman Hong, Sanghyun Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Examining the variation in policies across 47 U.S. cities, we show that political competition has a significant effect on governments’ regulatory responses to the sharing economy. Specifically, a greater level of political competition is associated with a more favorable regulatory response for sharing companies such as Airbnb. This finding is explained using the concepts of governmental status quo bias and adaptive governance. When considering the interests of the public and market incumbents, governments generally favor the latter (i.e., the status quo). This is because single-industry economic interests can more easily be organized into interest groups that can influence policymaking through lobbying. However, a greater level of political competition was found to reduce the power of entrenched market incumbents. This finding provides broad support to the hypothesis that the promotion of political accountability through greater political competition is conducive to adaptive governance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)283-290
Number of pages8
JournalGovernment Information Quarterly
Volume35
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Apr 1

Fingerprint

governance
economy
trend
market
interest group
promotion
responsibility
industry
economics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Law
  • Library and Information Sciences
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

@article{143d8adb77a1482cb2f39a0345e03c5a,
title = "Adaptive governance, status quo bias, and political competition: Why the sharing economy is welcome in some cities but not in others",
abstract = "Examining the variation in policies across 47 U.S. cities, we show that political competition has a significant effect on governments’ regulatory responses to the sharing economy. Specifically, a greater level of political competition is associated with a more favorable regulatory response for sharing companies such as Airbnb. This finding is explained using the concepts of governmental status quo bias and adaptive governance. When considering the interests of the public and market incumbents, governments generally favor the latter (i.e., the status quo). This is because single-industry economic interests can more easily be organized into interest groups that can influence policymaking through lobbying. However, a greater level of political competition was found to reduce the power of entrenched market incumbents. This finding provides broad support to the hypothesis that the promotion of political accountability through greater political competition is conducive to adaptive governance.",
author = "Sounman Hong and Sanghyun Lee",
year = "2018",
month = "4",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.giq.2018.02.001",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "283--290",
journal = "Government Information Quarterly",
issn = "0740-624X",
publisher = "Elsevier Limited",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Adaptive governance, status quo bias, and political competition

T2 - Why the sharing economy is welcome in some cities but not in others

AU - Hong, Sounman

AU - Lee, Sanghyun

PY - 2018/4/1

Y1 - 2018/4/1

N2 - Examining the variation in policies across 47 U.S. cities, we show that political competition has a significant effect on governments’ regulatory responses to the sharing economy. Specifically, a greater level of political competition is associated with a more favorable regulatory response for sharing companies such as Airbnb. This finding is explained using the concepts of governmental status quo bias and adaptive governance. When considering the interests of the public and market incumbents, governments generally favor the latter (i.e., the status quo). This is because single-industry economic interests can more easily be organized into interest groups that can influence policymaking through lobbying. However, a greater level of political competition was found to reduce the power of entrenched market incumbents. This finding provides broad support to the hypothesis that the promotion of political accountability through greater political competition is conducive to adaptive governance.

AB - Examining the variation in policies across 47 U.S. cities, we show that political competition has a significant effect on governments’ regulatory responses to the sharing economy. Specifically, a greater level of political competition is associated with a more favorable regulatory response for sharing companies such as Airbnb. This finding is explained using the concepts of governmental status quo bias and adaptive governance. When considering the interests of the public and market incumbents, governments generally favor the latter (i.e., the status quo). This is because single-industry economic interests can more easily be organized into interest groups that can influence policymaking through lobbying. However, a greater level of political competition was found to reduce the power of entrenched market incumbents. This finding provides broad support to the hypothesis that the promotion of political accountability through greater political competition is conducive to adaptive governance.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85042191709&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85042191709&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.giq.2018.02.001

DO - 10.1016/j.giq.2018.02.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85042191709

VL - 35

SP - 283

EP - 290

JO - Government Information Quarterly

JF - Government Information Quarterly

SN - 0740-624X

IS - 2

ER -