This article examines the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions: the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system. In the former system, the judge makes a decision based on her own acquired information, whereas in the latter system, the advocates are required to present their acquired information to the uninformed judge. Within the binary decision framework, I study the circumstances in which one system is superior to the other in terms of accuracy. The following two effects are notable in the adversarial system: The advocates exert more effort regarding information acquisition than the judge, and the adversarial judge gleans additional information from non-disclosure events. However, one inherent weakness of the adversarial system is its communication problem. In cases in which such a problem is more pronounced, the inquisitorial system should prevail despite its lack of incentives for information collection.
|Number of pages||37|
|Journal||Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization|
|Publication status||Published - 2014 Nov 1|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© The Author 2013.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management