Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition

Seung Ryong Yang, Jun Ki Min, Sung-Bae Cho

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer. This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market. Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers. For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed. Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-13
Number of pages13
JournalLecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Volume3339
Publication statusPublished - 2004 Dec 1
Event17th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI 2004: Advances in Artificial Intelligence - Cairns, Australia
Duration: 2004 Dec 42004 Dec 6

Fingerprint

Market Model
Coalitions
Personnel
Interaction
Experimental Results
Market

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

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Agent-based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition. / Yang, Seung Ryong; Min, Jun Ki; Cho, Sung-Bae.

In: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Vol. 3339, 01.12.2004, p. 1-13.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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