Abstract
How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that “buys votes” with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1002-1026 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Political Studies |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Nov 1 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Byungwon Woo’s research was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
Funding Information:
The authors thank the conference participants for their useful feedback. The paper has been previously presented at the Political Economy of International Organizations Conference and at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Byungwon Woo?s research was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2017.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science