Aid for Vote? United Nations General Assembly Voting and American Aid Allocation

Byungwon Woo, Eunbin Chung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that “buys votes” with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1002-1026
Number of pages25
JournalPolitical Studies
Volume66
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Nov 1

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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