Abstract
How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that “buys votes” with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1002-1026 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Political Studies |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Nov 1 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
}
Aid for Vote? United Nations General Assembly Voting and American Aid Allocation. / Woo, Byungwon; Chung, Eunbin.
In: Political Studies, Vol. 66, No. 4, 01.11.2018, p. 1002-1026.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Aid for Vote? United Nations General Assembly Voting and American Aid Allocation
AU - Woo, Byungwon
AU - Chung, Eunbin
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that “buys votes” with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.
AB - How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that “buys votes” with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041547227&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85041547227&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0032321717739144
DO - 10.1177/0032321717739144
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85041547227
VL - 66
SP - 1002
EP - 1026
JO - Political Studies
JF - Political Studies
SN - 0032-3217
IS - 4
ER -