All the (many, many) things we know: Extended knowledge

Jens Christian Bjerring; Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

doi:10.1111/phis.12024

All the (many, many) things we know: Extended knowledge

Jens Christian Bjerring, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Underwood Division

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis - the thesis that the mind extends into the world - on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	24-38
Number of pages	15
Journal	Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues
Volume	24
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12024
Publication status	Published - 2014 Oct 1

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© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy

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10.1111/phis.12024

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All the (many, many) things we know: Extended knowledge

Abstract

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