An equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration

Jay Pil Choi, Sang Seung Yi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The transactions-costs literature on vertical integration emphasizes that nonintegrated firms tend to make socially sub-optimal relationship-specific investments due to ex-post opportunism. This literature views vertical integration as a contractual remedy to overcome this underinvestment problem. In this paper, we demonstrate that integrating firms may inefficiently reduce non-specific investments for strategic reasons, e.g., to raise rival firms׳ costs. We construct a simple equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration, which also shows that anticompetitive vertical integration (both for consumer welfare and for aggregate efficiency) can arise in equilibrium without making the troublesome assumption of price commitment by the integrating firms. Our results hold under both Bertrand and Cournot downstream competition.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)659-676
Number of pages18
JournalResearch in Economics
Volume70
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Dec 1

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Vertical integration
Consumer welfare
Cournot competition
Transaction costs
Underinvestment
Costs
Remedies
Relationship-specific investments
Opportunism

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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An equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration. / Choi, Jay Pil; Yi, Sang Seung.

In: Research in Economics, Vol. 70, No. 4, 01.12.2016, p. 659-676.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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