An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game

Yeon Gyu Seo; Sung Bae Cho

doi:10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game

Yeon Gyu Seo, Sung Bae Cho

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The iterated prisoner's dilemma game has been used to study on the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. There have been much work on the relationship of number of players and cooperation, evolutionary strategy learning as a kind of machine learning, and the effect of payoff function to cooperation. This paper attempts to reveal that cooperative coalition size depends on payoff function and localization affects the evolution of cooperation in the N-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD). Localization makes individuals to interact or learn with adjacent individuals. Experimental result reports that cooperative coalition size increases as the gradient of the payoff function for cooperation becomes steeper than that of defector's payoff function or as minimum coalition size gets smaller. It is also shown that localization of interaction is an important factor to affect cooperative coalition.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers
Editors	Bob McKay, Xin Yao, Charles S. Newton, Jong-Hwan Kim, Takeshi Furuhashi
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	301-308
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Print)	3540659072, 9783540659075
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39
Publication status	Published - 1999
Event	2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998 - Canberra, Australia Duration: 1998 Nov 24 → 1998 Nov 27

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	1585
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Canberra
Period	98/11/24 → 98/11/27

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

Cite this

Seo, Y. G., & Cho, S. B. (1999). An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. In B. McKay, X. Yao, C. S. Newton, J-H. Kim, & T. Furuhashi (Eds.), Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers (pp. 301-308). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 1585). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

Seo, Yeon Gyu ; Cho, Sung Bae. / An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers. editor / Bob McKay ; Xin Yao ; Charles S. Newton ; Jong-Hwan Kim ; Takeshi Furuhashi. Springer Verlag, 1999. pp. 301-308 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "The iterated prisoner's dilemma game has been used to study on the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. There have been much work on the relationship of number of players and cooperation, evolutionary strategy learning as a kind of machine learning, and the effect of payoff function to cooperation. This paper attempts to reveal that cooperative coalition size depends on payoff function and localization affects the evolution of cooperation in the N-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD). Localization makes individuals to interact or learn with adjacent individuals. Experimental result reports that cooperative coalition size increases as the gradient of the payoff function for cooperation becomes steeper than that of defector's payoff function or as minimum coalition size gets smaller. It is also shown that localization of interaction is an important factor to affect cooperative coalition.",

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Seo, YG & Cho, SB 1999, An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. in B McKay, X Yao, CS Newton, J-H Kim & T Furuhashi (eds), Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 1585, Springer Verlag, pp. 301-308, 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Canberra, Australia, 98/11/24. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. / Seo, Yeon Gyu; Cho, Sung Bae.

Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers. ed. / Bob McKay; Xin Yao; Charles S. Newton; Jong-Hwan Kim; Takeshi Furuhashi. Springer Verlag, 1999. p. 301-308 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 1585).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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Seo YG, Cho SB. An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. In McKay B, Yao X, Newton CS, Kim J-H, Furuhashi T, editors, Simulated Evolution and Learning - 2nd Asia-Pacific Conference on Simulated Evolution and Learning, SEAL 1998, Selected Papers. Springer Verlag. 1999. p. 301-308. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_39

An evolutionary study on cooperation in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game

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