Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services

Sang Yeob Jung, Seung Min Yu, Seong-Lyun Kim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages505-512
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9783901882630
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1
Event2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014 - Hammamet, Tunisia
Duration: 2014 May 122014 May 16

Publication series

Name2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014

Other

Other2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014
CountryTunisia
CityHammamet
Period14/5/1214/5/16

Fingerprint

Mobile Networks
Auctions
Broadband
Wireless networks
Operator
Dynamic Games
Pricing
Bidding
Profit
Crossover
Costs
Profitability
Benchmark
Interaction

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Modelling and Simulation

Cite this

Jung, S. Y., Yu, S. M., & Kim, S-L. (2014). Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services. In 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014 (pp. 505-512). [6850339] (2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2014.6850339
Jung, Sang Yeob ; Yu, Seung Min ; Kim, Seong-Lyun. / Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services. 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. pp. 505-512 (2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014).
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Jung, SY, Yu, SM & Kim, S-L 2014, Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services. in 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014., 6850339, 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 505-512, 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014, Hammamet, Tunisia, 14/5/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2014.6850339

Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services. / Jung, Sang Yeob; Yu, Seung Min; Kim, Seong-Lyun.

2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014. IEEE Computer Society, 2014. p. 505-512 6850339 (2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Jung SY, Yu SM, Kim S-L. Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services. In 2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014. IEEE Computer Society. 2014. p. 505-512. 6850339. (2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014). https://doi.org/10.1109/WIOPT.2014.6850339