Asymmetric-valued spectrum auction and competition in wireless broadband services

Sang Yeob Jung, Seung Min Yu, Seong Lyun Kim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages505-512
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9783901882630
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Event2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014 - Hammamet, Tunisia
Duration: 2014 May 122014 May 16

Publication series

Name2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014

Other

Other2014 12th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2014
CountryTunisia
CityHammamet
Period14/5/1214/5/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Modelling and Simulation

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