Can expertise mitigate auditors' unintentional biases?

Andres Guiral, Waymond Rodgers, Emiliano Ruiz, Jose A. Gonzalo-Angulo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is important for both academics and practitioners to understand how biases influence auditing opinions, as well as how we might counteract those biases. According to moral seduction theory, auditors' judgments are morally induced by conflicts of interest in an unconscious manner. We combined an auditor ethical decision-making model with an expertise model in a laboratory experiment with European auditors to demonstrate that expertise helps to mitigate unconscious reporting bias in the going-concern setting. Our findings suggest that while problem-solving ability reinforces the auditors' public watchdog function, task-specific experience reduces their fear of provoking the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Our contribution to the literature is timely since the European Green Paper on Auditing is ignoring auditor education, learning, and training as potentially effective ways to enhance audit quality and increase professional skepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-117
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
Volume24
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Mar 1

Fingerprint

Auditors
Auditor expertise
Expertise
Auditing
Audit quality
Decision-making model
Self-fulfilling prophecy
Ethical decision making
Professional skepticism
Auditor judgment
Conflict of interest
Problem solving
Going concern
Reporting bias
Laboratory experiments
Education

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance

Cite this

Guiral, Andres ; Rodgers, Waymond ; Ruiz, Emiliano ; Gonzalo-Angulo, Jose A. / Can expertise mitigate auditors' unintentional biases?. In: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation. 2015 ; Vol. 24. pp. 105-117.
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Can expertise mitigate auditors' unintentional biases? / Guiral, Andres; Rodgers, Waymond; Ruiz, Emiliano; Gonzalo-Angulo, Jose A.

In: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 24, 01.03.2015, p. 105-117.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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