TY - JOUR
T1 - Capture and the bureaucratic mafia
T2 - does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?
AU - Hong, Sounman
AU - Lim, Jeehun
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Copyright:
Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - Does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity? To answer this question, we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in South Korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president. Specifically, we investigate whether after employing this high-ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding. Estimates from difference-in-difference, triple difference, and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high-profile public official’s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official’s former employing agency; no such advantage, however, was observed for benefits from other agencies. This result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources; the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official’s greater competence, expertise, or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government.
AB - Does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity? To answer this question, we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in South Korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president. Specifically, we investigate whether after employing this high-ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding. Estimates from difference-in-difference, triple difference, and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high-profile public official’s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official’s former employing agency; no such advantage, however, was observed for benefits from other agencies. This result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources; the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official’s greater competence, expertise, or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11127-016-0315-x
DO - 10.1007/s11127-016-0315-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84961136235
VL - 166
SP - 69
EP - 86
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 1-2
ER -