Centralized versus decentralized institutions for expert testimony

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)


The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert’s advice. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209-238
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jun

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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