Centralized versus decentralized institutions for expert testimony

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert’s advice. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)209-238
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Volume173
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jun

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
I am grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju and the referees for their valuable comments that substantially improved this article. I also thank participants at various seminars and conferences for their valuable comments. All remaining errors are mine. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2015 (2015-22-0076).

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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