Truck platooning is emerging as a promising solution with many economic incentives. However, securely admitting a new vehicle into a platoon is an extremely important yet difficult task. There is no adequate method today for verifying physical arrangements of vehicles within a platoon formation. Specifically, we address the problem of a platoon ghost attack wherein an attacker spoofs presence within a platoon to gain admission and subsequently execute malicious attacks. To address such concerns, we present Convoy, a novel autonomous platoon admission scheme which binds the vehicles' digital certificates to their physical context (i.e., locality). Convoy exploits the findings that vehicles traveling together experience similar context to prove to each other over time that they are co-present. Specifically, they experience similar road (e.g., bumps and cracks) and traffic (e.g., acceleration and steering) conditions. Our approach is based on the ability for vehicles to capture this context, generate fingerprints to establish shared keys, and later bind these symmetric keys to their public keys. We design and implement the Convoy protocol and evaluate it with real-world driving data. Our implementation demonstrates that vehicles traveling in adjacent lanes can be sufficiently distinguished by their context and this can be utilized to thwart platoon ghost attacks and similar misbehavior.
|Title of host publication||HotMobile 2017 - Proceedings of the 18th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery, Inc|
|Number of pages||6|
|Publication status||Published - 2017 Feb 21|
|Event||18th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, HotMobile 2017 - Sonoma, United States|
Duration: 2017 Feb 21 → 2017 Feb 22
|Name||HotMobile 2017 - Proceedings of the 18th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications|
|Conference||18th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, HotMobile 2017|
|Period||17/2/21 → 17/2/22|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We thank Kashish Mittal and the reviewers for valuable comments. This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CNS-1645759. The views and conclusions contained here are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either express or implied, of CMU, NSF, or the U.S. Government or any of its agencies.
© 2017 ACM.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Computer Science Applications