Abstract
A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 553-571 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1993 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
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Cooperative R&D with product market competition. / Choi, Jay Pil.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1993, p. 553-571.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperative R&D with product market competition
AU - Choi, Jay Pil
PY - 1993
Y1 - 1993
N2 - A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.
AB - A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=43949172438&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=43949172438&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0167-7187(93)90025-8
DO - 10.1016/0167-7187(93)90025-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:43949172438
VL - 11
SP - 553
EP - 571
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
SN - 0167-7187
IS - 4
ER -