Counterfeiting, screening and government policy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We construct a search theoretic model of money in which counterfeit money can be produced at a cost, but agents can screen for fake money, also at a cost. Counterfeiting can occur in equilibrium when both costs and the inflation rate are sufficiently low. Optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. However, the rationale for the Friedman rule in an economy with circulation of counterfeit money differs from the conventional mechanism that holds in the model when counterfeiting does not occur. We also study optimal anti-counterfeiting policy that determines the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)26-54
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume172
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Nov 1

Fingerprint

Government policy
Screening
Costs
Counterfeiting
Friedman rule
Counterfeit
Inflation rate
Optimal monetary policy
Rationale

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Counterfeiting, screening and government policy. / Kang, Kee Youn.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 172, 01.11.2017, p. 26-54.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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