Abstract
A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 112-114 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 167 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Jun |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
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Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression. / Kim, Jin Yeub.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 167, 06.2018, p. 112-114.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
AU - Kim, Jin Yeub
PY - 2018/6
Y1 - 2018/6
N2 - A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.
AB - A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044598867&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85044598867&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044598867
VL - 167
SP - 112
EP - 114
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
ER -