Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)112-114
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume167
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jun

Fingerprint

Attack
Aggression
Military
Rationale
Threat

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

@article{237efd817595467e837b4d07c4b06a5c,
title = "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression",
abstract = "A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.",
author = "Kim, {Jin Yeub}",
year = "2018",
month = "6",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003",
language = "English",
volume = "167",
pages = "112--114",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression. / Kim, Jin Yeub.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 167, 06.2018, p. 112-114.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression

AU - Kim, Jin Yeub

PY - 2018/6

Y1 - 2018/6

N2 - A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.

AB - A crisis begins when a potential aggressor makes a threat of attack against a target state, creating a stalemate. The potential aggressor's military technology improves over time, but its true military capability or intention is unknown. I show that the more sensitive the target state is to the danger of potential aggression, the greater the chance that the potential aggressor backs down and the lesser the risk of war. By committing to attacking sooner, the target state can increase security from aggression. My analysis provides a security rationale for counterthreatening to attack to prevent the realization of an aggressor attack.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044598867&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85044598867&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.003

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85044598867

VL - 167

SP - 112

EP - 114

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

ER -