Abstract
We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 403-433 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 Jun 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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Customer Information Sharing : Strategic Incentives and New Implications. / Kim, Byung Cheol; Choi, Jay Pil.
In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 2, 01.06.2010, p. 403-433.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Customer Information Sharing
T2 - Strategic Incentives and New Implications
AU - Kim, Byung Cheol
AU - Choi, Jay Pil
PY - 2010/6/1
Y1 - 2010/6/1
N2 - We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.
AB - We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77953883681&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00256.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00256.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77953883681
VL - 19
SP - 403
EP - 433
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
SN - 1058-6407
IS - 2
ER -