Customer Information Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications

Byung Cheol Kim, Jay Pil Choi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)403-433
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume19
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Jun 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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