Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we study decision making and games with vector outcomes. We provide a general framework where outcomes lie in a real topological vector space and the decision maker's preferences over outcomes are described by a preference cone, which is defined as a convex cone satisfying a continuity axiom. Further, we define a notion of utility representation and introduce a duality between outcomes and utilities. We provide conditions under which a preference cone is represented by a utility and is the dual of a set of utilities. We formulate a decision-making problem with vector outcomes and study optimal choices. We also consider games with vector outcomes and characterize the set of equilibria. Lastly, we discuss the problem of equilibrium selection based on our characterization.

Original languageEnglish
Article number20180170
JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 1

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Decision making
Convex cone
Equilibrium selection
Axiom
Continuity
Duality
Decision maker
Utility representation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes. / Park, Jaeok.

In: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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