Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games

Yuanzhang Xiao, Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. Without incentive mechanisms, selfish users transmit at their maximum power levels at the Nash equilibrium (NE), causing significant interference to each other. In order to induce users to transmit at desired power levels, existing works have proposed pricing and auctions as incentive mechanisms. With pricing or auctions, it is explicitly stated or implicitly assumed that the users are obedient, in that they adopt the utility functions designed by the system and accept the prices as control signals. In this paper, we use the intervention mechanism to incentivize selfish users to achieve efficient outcomes as the (unique) NE. In the intervention mechanism, a system designer prescribes a intervention rule and uses a intervention device to execute it. Depending on the monitoring technology and intervention capability of the intervention device, we propose two types of intervention rules with different performance and complexity tradeoffs. We study the performance achievable by the proposed intervention rules, as well as the design principles for different intervention rules. We prove that all the Pareto boundary can be achieved as the NE or even the unique NE of the game with intervention. Simulation results demonstrate the performance improvement achieved when using different intervention rules and illustrate performance analysis on different intervention rules.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Dec 1
Event54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011 - Houston, TX, United States
Duration: 2011 Dec 52011 Dec 9

Publication series

NameGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

Other

Other54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011
CountryUnited States
CityHouston, TX
Period11/12/511/12/9

Fingerprint

Power control
Wireless ad hoc networks
Costs
Monitoring

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Xiao, Y., Park, J., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2011). Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games. In 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011 [6134160] (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference). https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134160
Xiao, Yuanzhang ; Park, Jaeok ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games. 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011. 2011. (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference).
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Xiao, Y, Park, J & Van Der Schaar, M 2011, Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games. in 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011., 6134160, GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011, Houston, TX, United States, 11/12/5. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134160

Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games. / Xiao, Yuanzhang; Park, Jaeok; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011. 2011. 6134160 (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Xiao Y, Park J, Van Der Schaar M. Design and analysis of intervention mechanisms in power control games. In 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011. 2011. 6134160. (GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference). https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134160