Designing foreign policy

Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions

Elena V. McLean, Taehee Whang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, special interest groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to special interest groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, special interest groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic interest groups.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)589-602
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Peace Research
Volume51
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

Fingerprint

economic sanction
interest group
sanction
foreign policy
Economics
Costs
concession
public opinion
threat

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Safety Research
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

@article{a88529b1ad8342e5b5ed91ff2793ccf2,
title = "Designing foreign policy: Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions",
abstract = "The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, special interest groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to special interest groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, special interest groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic interest groups.",
author = "McLean, {Elena V.} and Taehee Whang",
year = "2014",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0022343314533811",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "589--602",
journal = "Journal of Peace Research",
issn = "0022-3433",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "5",

}

Designing foreign policy : Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions. / McLean, Elena V.; Whang, Taehee.

In: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 51, No. 5, 01.01.2014, p. 589-602.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Designing foreign policy

T2 - Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions

AU - McLean, Elena V.

AU - Whang, Taehee

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, special interest groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to special interest groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, special interest groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic interest groups.

AB - The literature on economic sanctions has long studied sender countries’ policymaking as a simple choice between imposing sanctions to extract concessions from the targeted country and doing nothing. We depart from this simplifying assumption and analyze sanctions as a multifaceted foreign policy instrument. We argue that senders design sanction policies in response to policy preferences of two domestic constituencies. Voters expect a response to an international dispute in the form of some policy, such as economic sanctions; hence, the sender’s policymakers seek to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs by imposing sanctions. Once the policymakers announce the use of sanctions, special interest groups that stand to experience economic losses when this foreign policy is implemented pressure the policymakers to choose sanction measures limiting such losses. As a result, the policymakers design sanction policies to include measures that will be less detrimental to special interest groups. We test our theoretical argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data and show that, while pressures from public opinion increase the likelihood of sanctions, special interest groups that benefit from the relationship with the target country are associated with a lower probability of the use of sanction measures that would impose substantial costs on domestic interest groups.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84907543087&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84907543087&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0022343314533811

DO - 10.1177/0022343314533811

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 589

EP - 602

JO - Journal of Peace Research

JF - Journal of Peace Research

SN - 0022-3433

IS - 5

ER -