Designing incentive schemes based on intervention

The case of imperfect monitoring

Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Pages221-232
Number of pages12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jul 31
Event2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 2011 Apr 162011 Apr 18

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume75 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period11/4/1611/4/18

Fingerprint

Monitoring
Communication

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Park, J., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2012). Designing incentive schemes based on intervention: The case of imperfect monitoring. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 221-232). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16
Park, Jaeok ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Designing incentive schemes based on intervention : The case of imperfect monitoring. Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. pp. 221-232 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).
@inproceedings{5228478dbcc64d719c4ef53488663ef5,
title = "Designing incentive schemes based on intervention: The case of imperfect monitoring",
abstract = "In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.",
author = "Jaeok Park and {Van Der Schaar}, Mihaela",
year = "2012",
month = "7",
day = "31",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783642303722",
series = "Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering",
pages = "221--232",
booktitle = "Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers",

}

Park, J & Van Der Schaar, M 2012, Designing incentive schemes based on intervention: The case of imperfect monitoring. in Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 75 LNICST, pp. 221-232, 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, 11/4/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16

Designing incentive schemes based on intervention : The case of imperfect monitoring. / Park, Jaeok; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 221-232 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Designing incentive schemes based on intervention

T2 - The case of imperfect monitoring

AU - Park, Jaeok

AU - Van Der Schaar, Mihaela

PY - 2012/7/31

Y1 - 2012/7/31

N2 - In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.

AB - In this paper, we propose a class of incentive schemes based on intervention. We develop a general game-theoretic framework for the design of intervention schemes under imperfect monitoring. We examine a model of slotted multiaccess communication to illustrate our framework. In this model, an intervention device monitors the behavior of agents for a period called the test phase and takes an intervention action which affects agents for the remaining period called the intervention phase. We analyze the problems of designing an optimal intervention rule given a length of the test phase and choosing an optimal length of the test phase. Intervention schemes can induce cooperative behavior by applying intervention following signals with a high likelihood of deviation. Increasing the length of the test phase has two counteracting effects: It improves the quality of signals, but at the same time it weakens the impact of intervention due to increased delay.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869595523&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84869595523&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9783642303722

T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

SP - 221

EP - 232

BT - Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers

ER -

Park J, Van Der Schaar M. Designing incentive schemes based on intervention: The case of imperfect monitoring. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 221-232. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_16