Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community

Yu Zhang, Jaeok Park, Mihaela Van Der Schaar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Sustaining cooperation among self-interested agents is critical for the proliferation of emerging networked communities, such as the communities formed by social networking services. Providing incentives for cooperation in networked communities is particularly challenging because of their unique features: a large population of anonymous agents interacting infrequently, having asymmetric interests, and dynamically joining and leaving the network; network operation errors; and low-cost identity whitewashing. In this paper, taking these features into consideration, we propose a framework for the design and analysis of a class of incentive schemes based on social norms. We first define the concept of sustainable social norm under which no agent has an incentive to deviate. We then formulate the problem of designing an optimal social norm, which selects a social norm that maximizes overall social welfare among all sustainable social norms. Using the proposed framework, we study the structure of optimal social norms and the impacts of punishment lengths and whitewashing on optimal social norms. Our results show that optimal social norms are capable of sustaining cooperation, with the amount of cooperation varying depending on the community characteristics.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Pages578-593
Number of pages16
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jul 31
Event2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 2011 Apr 162011 Apr 18

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume75 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period11/4/1611/4/18

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

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Zhang, Y., Park, J., & Van Der Schaar, M. (2012). Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 578-593). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_40
Zhang, Yu ; Park, Jaeok ; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela. / Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community. Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. pp. 578-593 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).
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Zhang, Y, Park, J & Van Der Schaar, M 2012, Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community. in Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 75 LNICST, pp. 578-593, 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, 11/4/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_40

Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community. / Zhang, Yu; Park, Jaeok; Van Der Schaar, Mihaela.

Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 578-593 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Zhang Y, Park J, Van Der Schaar M. Designing social norm based incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in a large community. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 578-593. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_40