Devil in a box: Installing backdoors in electronic door locks

Seongyeol Oh, Joon Sung Yang, Andrea Bianchi, Hyoungshick Kim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Electronic door locks must be carefully designed to allow valid users to open (or close) a door and prevent unauthorized people from opening (or closing) the door. However, lock manufacturers have often ignored the fact that door locks can be modified by attackers in the real world. In this paper, we demonstrate that the most popular electronic door locks can easily be compromised by inserting a malicious hardware backdoor to perform unauthorized operations on the door locks. Attackers can replay a valid DC voltage pulse to open (or close) the door in an unauthorized manner or capture the user's personal identification number (PIN) used for the door lock.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2015 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015
EditorsHuseyin Hisil, Ali Ghorbani, Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro, Ahmet Koltuksuz, Vincenc Torra, Jie Zhang, Murat Sensoy, Ibrahim Zincir, Ali Miri
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages139-144
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781467378284
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Aug 31
Event13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015 - Izmir, Turkey
Duration: 2015 Jul 212015 Jul 23

Publication series

Name2015 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015

Conference

Conference13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2015
CountryTurkey
CityIzmir
Period15/7/2115/7/23

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Hardware and Architecture

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