Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities

Patrick Grim, Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Bennett Holman, Sean McGeehan, William J. Berger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Hong and Page ‘diversity trumps ability’ result has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts. Here we extend Hong and Page’s model to landscapes of different degrees of randomness and demonstrate the sensitivity of the ‘diversity trumps ability’ result. This analysis offers a more nuanced picture of how diversity, ability, and expertise may relate. Although models of this sort can indeed be suggestive for diversity policies, we advise against interpreting such results overly broadly.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)98-123
Number of pages26
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume86
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 1

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Expertise
Epistemic Communities
Randomness

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Grim, P., Singer, D. J., Bramson, A., Holman, B., McGeehan, S., & Berger, W. J. (2019). Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities. Philosophy of Science, 86(1), 98-123. https://doi.org/10.1086/701070
Grim, Patrick ; Singer, Daniel J. ; Bramson, Aaron ; Holman, Bennett ; McGeehan, Sean ; Berger, William J. / Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities. In: Philosophy of Science. 2019 ; Vol. 86, No. 1. pp. 98-123.
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Grim, P, Singer, DJ, Bramson, A, Holman, B, McGeehan, S & Berger, WJ 2019, 'Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities', Philosophy of Science, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 98-123. https://doi.org/10.1086/701070

Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities. / Grim, Patrick; Singer, Daniel J.; Bramson, Aaron; Holman, Bennett; McGeehan, Sean; Berger, William J.

In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 86, No. 1, 01.01.2019, p. 98-123.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Grim P, Singer DJ, Bramson A, Holman B, McGeehan S, Berger WJ. Diversity, ability, and expertise in epistemic communities. Philosophy of Science. 2019 Jan 1;86(1):98-123. https://doi.org/10.1086/701070