Abstract
Previous studies have discussed the effects of electoral competition on corruption, but only a few explored the effects of political power shifts – the results of electoral competition. To fill the gap, this study tests hypotheses that three types of political power shifts (the shifts of individual local government heads, local government ruling party, and local council majority) reduce the corruption (overall, external, and internal), with a panel data set of 226 Korean local governments. The empirical study shows that only shifts in the local government head reduce internal corruption. The other dependent and independent variables do not have any significant relationships. This can be because of structural matters of Korean local politics such as strong mayor-weak council and the closed local elite networks.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 350-362 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Japanese Journal of Political Science |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 Dec 22 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
