Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing

Minsoo Park, Sang Woo Lee, Yong Jae Choi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Although the auctioning spectrum is generally considered to be highly successful, many countries still rely on beauty contests to assign spectrums. This is often attributed to the negative perceptions about the potential problems that auctions may cause, such as high licensing fees, high consumer prices, a lower incentive to invest in infrastructure, and concerns about market concentration.To address these negative perceptions, this paper estimates the effects of the auctions and the licensing fees for the 3G spectrum on consumer prices, the timing of a new service launch, and the market structure using data from the mobile markets of 21 OECD countries. Although our study uses a relatively small sample and a simple methodology, the results are meaningful since it examines a single service (3G) in OECD countries. Some of these countries have adopted auctions while others have used the traditional beauty contest approach. This combination provides a natural experiment to evaluate the impact of auctions on the mobile telecommunications market.The estimation results show no evidence to support claims of negative effects of spectrum auctions in the mobile communications market. This study calls for more positive action toward spectrum auctions in many countries who seek to improve the efficiency and transparency of spectrum assignment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)118-126
Number of pages9
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume23
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Mar 1

Fingerprint

market
OECD
mobile communication
telecommunication
transparency
licencing
Licensing
Auctions
incentive
infrastructure
methodology
Contests
Consumer prices
Fees
OECD countries
Spectrum auctions
experiment
effect
price
services

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

Park, Minsoo ; Lee, Sang Woo ; Choi, Yong Jae. / Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing. In: Information Economics and Policy. 2011 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 118-126.
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Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing. / Park, Minsoo; Lee, Sang Woo; Choi, Yong Jae.

In: Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, 01.03.2011, p. 118-126.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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