Teacher turnover has been reported as a strong predictor for students’ academic achievement, yet little is known about the determinants of teacher turnover. Using a fixed effects model, we analyze panel data of individual teachers in North Carolina schools to test the effects of monetary incentives on teacher turnover. We find a U-shaped relationship between teacher salary and turnover, while the effects of group-based merit pay on turnover depend on salary level. Assuming that a teacher’s salary reflects their qualifications, the current study concludes that overqualified and underqualified teachers are likely to leave and that group-based merit pay causes turnover among qualified teachers.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2017S1A3A2067636).
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Public Administration
- Strategy and Management
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation