Effects of Monetary Incentives on Teacher Turnover: A Longitudinal Analysis

Sangyub Ryu, Yusuke Jinnai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Teacher turnover has been reported as a strong predictor for students’ academic achievement, yet little is known about the determinants of teacher turnover. Using a fixed effects model, we analyze panel data of individual teachers in North Carolina schools to test the effects of monetary incentives on teacher turnover. We find a U-shaped relationship between teacher salary and turnover, while the effects of group-based merit pay on turnover depend on salary level. Assuming that a teacher’s salary reflects their qualifications, the current study concludes that overqualified and underqualified teachers are likely to leave and that group-based merit pay causes turnover among qualified teachers.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPublic Personnel Management
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2017S1A3A2067636).

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Public Administration
  • Strategy and Management
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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