Empirical implications of signaling models: Estimation of belief updating in international crisis bargaining

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Signaling models are ubiquitous in political science. An essential characteristic of these models is that actors can update their beliefs about their opponents. An actor observes the behavior of his opponent, and this behavior functions as a signal that allows the actor to learn more about his opponent's true "type." As a result, the actor is able to adapt his own behavior. Current statistical models of strategic choice based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, however, allow for very little, if any, belief updating. I explain why current models allow for little updating and offer in their stead a new, fully strategic choice estimator that calculates the correct amount of belief updating.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)381-402
Number of pages22
JournalPolitical Analysis
Volume18
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Jun 10

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political science

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Empirical implications of signaling models : Estimation of belief updating in international crisis bargaining. / Whang, Taehee.

In: Political Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, 10.06.2010, p. 381-402.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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