Entitlement, value and rationality

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22 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: first, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, second, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic reasons-and thus supports epistemic rationality-because, when P is an entitlement, trust in P is a dominant strategy with respect to promotion of epistemic value. The second line of response replaces dominance with maximization of expected utility. I argue that both of these proposals are flawed and develop an alternative line of response.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)443-457
Number of pages15
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Dec

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Danish Research Agency and the Carlsberg Foundation.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)


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