We study how plea-bargaining behaviors may respond to a change in two impor-tant policy variables in criminal law: the level of exoneree compensation and the accuracy of the exoneration process. Confirming the theoretical predictions, we experimentally find that prosecutor subjects make more lenient plea-bargaining offers in response to higher exoneree compensation, and less lenient offers in response to higher exoneration accuracy. We also find that defendant subjects do not directly respond to a variation in exoneree compensation, and are less likely to plead guilty when exoneration accuracy is lower, the effect being significantly stronger for guilty defendants.
|Number of pages||28|
|Journal||Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics|
|Publication status||Published - 2021|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2019 (#2019-22-0096) and by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A8028855).
© 2020 Mohr Siebeck.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics