Exoneree compensation and endogenous plea bargaining: Theory and experiment

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Abstract

We study how plea-bargaining behaviors may respond to a change in two impor-tant policy variables in criminal law: the level of exoneree compensation and the accuracy of the exoneration process. Confirming the theoretical predictions, we experimentally find that prosecutor subjects make more lenient plea-bargaining offers in response to higher exoneree compensation, and less lenient offers in response to higher exoneration accuracy. We also find that defendant subjects do not directly respond to a variation in exoneree compensation, and are less likely to plead guilty when exoneration accuracy is lower, the effect being significantly stronger for guilty defendants.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)28-55
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Volume177
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2019 (#2019-22-0096) and by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A8028855).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Mohr Siebeck.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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