Game-theoretic understanding of price dynamics in mobile communication services

Seung Min Yu, Seong-Lyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In mobile communication services, users wish to subscribe to high-quality service at a low price level, which leads to competition between mobile network operators (MNOs). The MNOs compete with each other by service prices after deciding the extent of investment to improve quality of service. Unfortunately, the theoretic backgrounds of price dynamics are not known to us, and as a result, effective network planning and regulative actions are hard to make in the competitive market. To explain this competition in more detail, we formulate and solve an optimization problem applying the two-stage Cournot and Bertrand competition model. Consequently, we derive price dynamics that the MNOs increase and decrease their service prices periodically, which completely explains the subsidy dynamics in the real world. Moving forward, to avoid this instability and inefficiency, we suggest a simple regulation rule, which leads to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium point. Moreover, we suggest regulator's optimal actions corresponding to user welfare and the regulator's revenue.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6841040
Pages (from-to)5120-5131
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Volume13
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sep 1

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Mobile Communication
Wireless networks
Game
Mobile Networks
Communication
Regulator
Operator
Quality of service
Network Planning
Competition Model
Service Quality
Planning
Welfare
Equilibrium Point
Quality of Service
Optimization Problem
Decrease

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

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Game-theoretic understanding of price dynamics in mobile communication services. / Yu, Seung Min; Kim, Seong-Lyun.

In: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Vol. 13, No. 9, 6841040, 01.09.2014, p. 5120-5131.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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