Abstract
Climate change has a different impact on each member of society. To reduce the damage caused by climate change, adaptation activities are being initiated, such as expanding the capacity of social infrastructures, and each stakeholder wants these adaptations to work in his or her favor. Therefore, a methodology is needed to determine adaptation measures that are most beneficial to all members of society. In this paper, a framework is proposed for producing an adaptation strategy that minimizes conflict between stakeholders. This framework casts the process of organizing climate change adaptations as a game and defines each community member as a stakeholder, each adaptation measure as a strategy, and the minimization of loss from future climate change as a payoff. In a case study involving sea level rise in Suncheon Bay, Korea, this framework is used to generate an optimal plan for minimizing conflicts while considering the losses of the central government, local governments, and local communities. The game theoretic results from the proposed framework enable a balanced distribution of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve infrastructure adaptation to climate change.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 04018034 |
| Journal | Journal of Management in Engineering |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Nov 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Industrial relations
- Engineering(all)
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research
Cite this
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Game Theory-Based Analysis of Decision Making for Coastal Adaptation under Multilateral Participation. / Jeong, Hoyoung; Seo, Hojung; Kim, Hyoungkwan.
In: Journal of Management in Engineering, Vol. 34, No. 6, 04018034, 01.11.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Game Theory-Based Analysis of Decision Making for Coastal Adaptation under Multilateral Participation
AU - Jeong, Hoyoung
AU - Seo, Hojung
AU - Kim, Hyoungkwan
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - Climate change has a different impact on each member of society. To reduce the damage caused by climate change, adaptation activities are being initiated, such as expanding the capacity of social infrastructures, and each stakeholder wants these adaptations to work in his or her favor. Therefore, a methodology is needed to determine adaptation measures that are most beneficial to all members of society. In this paper, a framework is proposed for producing an adaptation strategy that minimizes conflict between stakeholders. This framework casts the process of organizing climate change adaptations as a game and defines each community member as a stakeholder, each adaptation measure as a strategy, and the minimization of loss from future climate change as a payoff. In a case study involving sea level rise in Suncheon Bay, Korea, this framework is used to generate an optimal plan for minimizing conflicts while considering the losses of the central government, local governments, and local communities. The game theoretic results from the proposed framework enable a balanced distribution of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve infrastructure adaptation to climate change.
AB - Climate change has a different impact on each member of society. To reduce the damage caused by climate change, adaptation activities are being initiated, such as expanding the capacity of social infrastructures, and each stakeholder wants these adaptations to work in his or her favor. Therefore, a methodology is needed to determine adaptation measures that are most beneficial to all members of society. In this paper, a framework is proposed for producing an adaptation strategy that minimizes conflict between stakeholders. This framework casts the process of organizing climate change adaptations as a game and defines each community member as a stakeholder, each adaptation measure as a strategy, and the minimization of loss from future climate change as a payoff. In a case study involving sea level rise in Suncheon Bay, Korea, this framework is used to generate an optimal plan for minimizing conflicts while considering the losses of the central government, local governments, and local communities. The game theoretic results from the proposed framework enable a balanced distribution of responsibilities among stakeholders to achieve infrastructure adaptation to climate change.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050890879&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85050890879&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000637
DO - 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000637
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85050890879
VL - 34
JO - Journal of Management in Engineering - ASCE
JF - Journal of Management in Engineering - ASCE
SN - 0742-597X
IS - 6
M1 - 04018034
ER -