As the IoT era comes to the full-fledged, hardware Trojans that involve malicious modifications of circuitry are becoming a growing security concern. To avoid a detection mechanism, hardware Trojans may need a stealthy nature in their existence for being dormant, and even when triggered. In this paper, we devise a new hardware Trojan concept that exploits natural glitches and their control mechanisms for information leakage in a stealthy manner. We indeed reversely exploit the glitch control mechanisms to be bypassed when triggered, and try to recall the natural glitches for the purpose. An adversary who triggered the hardware Trojan may infer multiple input values from a single output of the target logic, thereby obtaining multiple outputs of the preceding logics, by monitoring the existence of the natural glitches. We perform experiments and discuss the results and threats, not to be neglected, along with a possible mitigation.
|Title of host publication||Information Security Applications - 18th International Conference, WISA 2017, Revised Selected Papers|
|Editors||Brent ByungHoon Kang, Taesoo Kim|
|Number of pages||12|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|
|Event||18th World International Conference on Information Security and Application, WISA 2017 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of|
Duration: 2017 Aug 24 → 2017 Aug 26
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Other||18th World International Conference on Information Security and Application, WISA 2017|
|Country||Korea, Republic of|
|Period||17/8/24 → 17/8/26|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was supported by Defense Acquisition Program Administration and Agency for Defense Development under the contract (UD160066BD).
© 2018, Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)