Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively. We then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged. We show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self-reporting by cartel members.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)528-540
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume30
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Nov 1

Fingerprint

International cooperation
Cartels
Leniency programs
Self-reporting
Information sharing
Cartel

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

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Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation. / Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 30, No. 6, 01.11.2012, p. 528-540.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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