Abstract
The role of government in forming and coordinating R&D consortia has often been cited in studies of the economic success of latecomer countries such as Korea and Japan. Most previous studies documented the government's efforts to provide funding. In our research about the government's role in determining the quality of innovation, we develop a computational model based on genetic algorithms. The two main aspects of government involvement explored in this study are 1) the timing of evaluation of participating firms in a consortium, and 2) the form that these consortia take. In terms of the timing of evaluation, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. In addition, the effect of the form of the consortium depends on the timing of evaluation. An inverse pyramid arrangement, which emphasizes variation at the beginning of the innovation process, outperforms a pyramid-form arrangement only when evaluation is continuous. We identify the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection as the force underlying the results of this study. We discuss these findings and their implications for how governments should balance diversity and selection when designing innovation systems.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 202-215 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Technological Forecasting and Social Change |
| Volume | 88 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business and International Management
- Applied Psychology
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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Government roles in evaluation and arrangement of R&D consortia. / Kim, Ji hyun; Bae, Sung Joo; Yang, Jae Suk.
In: Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 88, 01.01.2014, p. 202-215.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Government roles in evaluation and arrangement of R&D consortia
AU - Kim, Ji hyun
AU - Bae, Sung Joo
AU - Yang, Jae Suk
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - The role of government in forming and coordinating R&D consortia has often been cited in studies of the economic success of latecomer countries such as Korea and Japan. Most previous studies documented the government's efforts to provide funding. In our research about the government's role in determining the quality of innovation, we develop a computational model based on genetic algorithms. The two main aspects of government involvement explored in this study are 1) the timing of evaluation of participating firms in a consortium, and 2) the form that these consortia take. In terms of the timing of evaluation, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. In addition, the effect of the form of the consortium depends on the timing of evaluation. An inverse pyramid arrangement, which emphasizes variation at the beginning of the innovation process, outperforms a pyramid-form arrangement only when evaluation is continuous. We identify the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection as the force underlying the results of this study. We discuss these findings and their implications for how governments should balance diversity and selection when designing innovation systems.
AB - The role of government in forming and coordinating R&D consortia has often been cited in studies of the economic success of latecomer countries such as Korea and Japan. Most previous studies documented the government's efforts to provide funding. In our research about the government's role in determining the quality of innovation, we develop a computational model based on genetic algorithms. The two main aspects of government involvement explored in this study are 1) the timing of evaluation of participating firms in a consortium, and 2) the form that these consortia take. In terms of the timing of evaluation, we find that continuous evaluation is consistently superior to early evaluation. In addition, the effect of the form of the consortium depends on the timing of evaluation. An inverse pyramid arrangement, which emphasizes variation at the beginning of the innovation process, outperforms a pyramid-form arrangement only when evaluation is continuous. We identify the tension and reconciliation between diversity and selection as the force underlying the results of this study. We discuss these findings and their implications for how governments should balance diversity and selection when designing innovation systems.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904887549&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.techfore.2014.06.022
DO - 10.1016/j.techfore.2014.06.022
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84904887549
VL - 88
SP - 202
EP - 215
JO - Technological Forecasting and Social Change
JF - Technological Forecasting and Social Change
SN - 0040-1625
ER -