Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to make two major contributions to the literature that studies the ownership structure of business conglomerates. First, we introduce the concept of group control motive and empirically show that this motive greatly shapes the controlling-minority ownership structure. Using a two stage least squares (2SLS) framework, we show that controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings in firms that have greater contribution to group control, and alternatively show that firms in which the controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings are made to have greater contribution to group control. Second, we find that the level of disparity between voting and cash flow rights is significantly higher than the levels previously reported in the literature on Korean firms when we include non-public firms and adopt a control concept that is more flexible and closer to reality.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 213-252 |
| Number of pages | 40 |
| Journal | Pacific Basin Finance Journal |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Jun 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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Group control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates. Evidence from Korea's chaebols. / Kim, Woochan; Lim, Youngjae; Sung, Taeyoon.
In: Pacific Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3, 01.06.2007, p. 213-252.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Group control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates. Evidence from Korea's chaebols
AU - Kim, Woochan
AU - Lim, Youngjae
AU - Sung, Taeyoon
PY - 2007/6/1
Y1 - 2007/6/1
N2 - In this paper, we attempt to make two major contributions to the literature that studies the ownership structure of business conglomerates. First, we introduce the concept of group control motive and empirically show that this motive greatly shapes the controlling-minority ownership structure. Using a two stage least squares (2SLS) framework, we show that controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings in firms that have greater contribution to group control, and alternatively show that firms in which the controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings are made to have greater contribution to group control. Second, we find that the level of disparity between voting and cash flow rights is significantly higher than the levels previously reported in the literature on Korean firms when we include non-public firms and adopt a control concept that is more flexible and closer to reality.
AB - In this paper, we attempt to make two major contributions to the literature that studies the ownership structure of business conglomerates. First, we introduce the concept of group control motive and empirically show that this motive greatly shapes the controlling-minority ownership structure. Using a two stage least squares (2SLS) framework, we show that controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings in firms that have greater contribution to group control, and alternatively show that firms in which the controlling families hold greater direct shareholdings are made to have greater contribution to group control. Second, we find that the level of disparity between voting and cash flow rights is significantly higher than the levels previously reported in the literature on Korean firms when we include non-public firms and adopt a control concept that is more flexible and closer to reality.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34249336051&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34249336051&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.05.003
DO - 10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.05.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34249336051
VL - 15
SP - 213
EP - 252
JO - Pacific Basin Finance Journal
JF - Pacific Basin Finance Journal
SN - 0927-538X
IS - 3
ER -