Abstract
What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists' needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 417-432 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of the American Philosophical Association |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 Jan 1 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
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How A-Theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius. / Deng, Natalja.
In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 1, No. 3, 01.01.2015, p. 417-432.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - How A-Theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius
AU - Deng, Natalja
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists' needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.
AB - What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists' needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85015332268&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85015332268&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/apa.2015.1
DO - 10.1017/apa.2015.1
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85015332268
VL - 1
SP - 417
EP - 432
JO - Journal of the American Philosophical Association
JF - Journal of the American Philosophical Association
SN - 2053-4477
IS - 3
ER -