How A-Theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists' needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)417-432
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of the American Philosophical Association
Volume1
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jan 1

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Lucretius
Intrinsic Value
Intrinsic
Metaphysical
Person
John Martin Fischer

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

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How A-Theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius. / Deng, Natalja.

In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 1, No. 3, 01.01.2015, p. 417-432.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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