How outside directors facilitate corporate R&D investment? Evidence from large Korean firms

Taeyoung Yoo, Taeyoon Sung

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines how outside directors facilitate corporate R&D investment in the face of family control and the discrepancy between share ownership and decision control. Our panel regression analysis of large Korean firms (1998 to 2005) shows that mere addition of a shareholder-oriented mechanism, namely outside directors, is not effective for promoting R&D intensity. However, the disciplining role of outside directors can become valid for R&D intensity by moderating the negative influence of the discrepancy when a firms' growth opportunity is high. In addition, family control is positively related to a firm's R&D investment when the firm's growth opportunity is low. Thus, we argue that the strategic management of organizational change in corporate governance should take into account the disciplining role of shareholder-oriented mechanisms in the context of ownership structure and a firm's strategic position.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1251-1260
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Business Research
Volume68
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1

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Outside directors
Growth opportunities
Discrepancy
Shareholders
Family control
Firm growth
Strategic management
Corporate governance
Ownership structure
Share ownership
Panel regression analysis
Organizational change

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Marketing

Cite this

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How outside directors facilitate corporate R&D investment? Evidence from large Korean firms. / Yoo, Taeyoung; Sung, Taeyoon.

In: Journal of Business Research, Vol. 68, No. 6, 01.06.2015, p. 1251-1260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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