In dealing with a hawkish rival: Game theoretic and empirical analyses of the Korean peninsula case

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Abstract

This research uses game theoretic and event data analyses to come up with strategies for South Korea and the United States in dealing with the hawkish North Korea and examine impacts of the neighboring great-power behavior on the stability of the Korean peninsula. Findings suggest that South Korea and the United States should take a "middle position" in dealing with the hawkish North Korea and let North Korea know surely that they do so. Contrary to common belief, findings suggest that if the US follows the principle of reciprocity, a firm position towards Pyongyang helps promote its cooperative behavior toward Seoul. In addition, if the South Korean government maintains the principle of rendering sincere assistance to the North at its request, there is a greater possibility it will accept the South's proposal for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. By taking the middle position and letting North Korea know it, South Korea and the United States would produce a successful negotiation outcome even when they face the coming nuclear crisis in 2003. Regarding the growing Russian influence on North Korea's behavior, if a strong ROK-US relationship is a necessary condition for stability on the Korean peninsula, Seoul's efforts to improve its ties with Russia and China may well be sufficient preparation to induce North Korea's cooperative behavior .toward South Korea.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)29-50+2
JournalKorean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume14
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2002 Sep 1

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North Korea
South Korea
cooperative behavior
great power
reciprocity
Russia
assistance
dialogue
firm
China
event

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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In dealing with a hawkish rival : Game theoretic and empirical analyses of the Korean peninsula case. / Kim, Woosang.

In: Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 2, 01.09.2002, p. 29-50+2.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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