TY - JOUR
T1 - In defense of meta-analysis
AU - Holman, Bennett
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/8/15
Y1 - 2019/8/15
N2 - Arguments that medical decision making should rely on a variety of evidence often begin from the claim that meta-analysis has been shown to be problematic. In this paper, I first examine Stegenga’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part C Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 42:497–507, 2011) argument that meta-analysis requires multiple decisions and thus fails to provide an objective ground for medical decision making. Next, I examine three arguments from social epistemologists that contend that meta-analyses are systematically biased in ways not appreciated by standard epistemology. In most cases I show that critiques of meta-analysis fail to account for the full range of meta-analytic procedures. In the remainder of cases, I argue that the critiques identify problems that do not uniquely cut against meta-analysis. I close by suggesting one reason why it may be pragmatically rational to violate the principle of total evidence and by outlining the criteria for a successful argument against meta-analysis. A set of criteria I contend remain unmet.
AB - Arguments that medical decision making should rely on a variety of evidence often begin from the claim that meta-analysis has been shown to be problematic. In this paper, I first examine Stegenga’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part C Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 42:497–507, 2011) argument that meta-analysis requires multiple decisions and thus fails to provide an objective ground for medical decision making. Next, I examine three arguments from social epistemologists that contend that meta-analyses are systematically biased in ways not appreciated by standard epistemology. In most cases I show that critiques of meta-analysis fail to account for the full range of meta-analytic procedures. In the remainder of cases, I argue that the critiques identify problems that do not uniquely cut against meta-analysis. I close by suggesting one reason why it may be pragmatically rational to violate the principle of total evidence and by outlining the criteria for a successful argument against meta-analysis. A set of criteria I contend remain unmet.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11229-018-1690-2
DO - 10.1007/s11229-018-1690-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85040861555
VL - 196
SP - 3189
EP - 3211
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 8
ER -