Information concealment in the theory of vertical integration

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A model of vertical integration is proposed in which the motive for vertical integration lies in the concealment of information to other firms, rather than uncovering of a new information. Since a vertically integrated firm trades internally rather than making publicly observable market transactions, vertical integration offers an opportunity for the integrated firm to turn previously observable market data into private information. It will be shown that when the acquisition cost of input is uncertain, the ex ante profit of a downstream firm will increase if the ex post realized value is private information, thereby providing a theory of vertical integration based on strategic information concealment. Welfare implications of vertical integration are also considered. Finally, we demonstrate that the vertically integrated firm will adopt an inefficient sourcing rule when there are alternative, but inferior input suppliers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)117-131
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume35
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1998 Mar 30

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Vertical integration
Integrated
Private information
Profit
Suppliers
Sourcing
Costs
Market data
Welfare implications

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Cite this

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Information concealment in the theory of vertical integration. / Choi, Jay Pil.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1, 30.03.1998, p. 117-131.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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