Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules

Richard J. La; Jeonghoon Mo

doi:10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467

Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules

Richard J. La, Jeonghoon Mo

Department of Industrial Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a scenario where an application service provider (ASP) hires a network service provider (NSP) to deliver its service and pays for the employment of the NSP. We study the interaction between these two providers under simple payment rules as a Stackelberg game. We first show, under the assumption that the ASP knows the true utility function of the NSP, the existence of a unique equilibrium of the game and investigate its properties when the NSP is risk averse. Then, we relax the assumption that the ASP is aware of the NSP's true utility function and point out a potential source of difficulty in designing a pricing mechanism that encourages truth-telling by the NSP.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	8594-8599
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	9781424438716
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467
Publication status	Published - 2009
Event	48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 - Shanghai, China Duration: 2009 Dec 15 → 2009 Dec 18

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)	0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)	2576-2370

Other

Other	48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
Country/Territory	China
City	Shanghai
Period	09/12/15 → 09/12/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Control and Systems Engineering
Modelling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Access to Document

10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467

Cite this

La, R. J., & Mo, J. (2009). Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 (pp. 8594-8599). [5400467] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467

La, Richard J. ; Mo, Jeonghoon. / Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2009. pp. 8594-8599 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).

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abstract = "We consider a scenario where an application service provider (ASP) hires a network service provider (NSP) to deliver its service and pays for the employment of the NSP. We study the interaction between these two providers under simple payment rules as a Stackelberg game. We first show, under the assumption that the ASP knows the true utility function of the NSP, the existence of a unique equilibrium of the game and investigate its properties when the NSP is risk averse. Then, we relax the assumption that the ASP is aware of the NSP's true utility function and point out a potential source of difficulty in designing a pricing mechanism that encourages truth-telling by the NSP.",

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note = "48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 ; Conference date: 15-12-2009 Through 18-12-2009",

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La, RJ & Mo, J 2009, Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. in Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009., 5400467, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 8594-8599, 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009, Shanghai, China, 09/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467

Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. / La, Richard J.; Mo, Jeonghoon.

Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2009. p. 8594-8599 5400467 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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La RJ, Mo J. Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2009. p. 8594-8599. 5400467. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). doi: 10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467

Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules

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