Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules

Richard J. La, Jeonghoon Mo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a scenario where an application service provider (ASP) hires a network service provider (NSP) to deliver its service and pays for the employment of the NSP. We study the interaction between these two providers under simple payment rules as a Stackelberg game. We first show, under the assumption that the ASP knows the true utility function of the NSP, the existence of a unique equilibrium of the game and investigate its properties when the NSP is risk averse. Then, we relax the assumption that the ASP is aware of the NSP's true utility function and point out a potential source of difficulty in designing a pricing mechanism that encourages truth-telling by the NSP.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
Pages8594-8599
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Dec 1
Event48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 2009 Dec 152009 Dec 18

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period09/12/1509/12/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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  • Cite this

    La, R. J., & Mo, J. (2009). Interaction of service providers in task delegation under simple payment rules. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 (pp. 8594-8599). [5400467] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5400467