Abstract
Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 427-452 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | International Interactions |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 May 27 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations