Abstract
Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 427-452 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | International Interactions |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 May 27 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
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International Signaling and Economic Sanctions. / Whang, Taehee; Kim, Hannah June.
In: International Interactions, Vol. 41, No. 3, 27.05.2015, p. 427-452.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - International Signaling and Economic Sanctions
AU - Whang, Taehee
AU - Kim, Hannah June
PY - 2015/5/27
Y1 - 2015/5/27
N2 - Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.
AB - Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84931036502&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/03050629.2015.1024242
DO - 10.1080/03050629.2015.1024242
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84931036502
VL - 41
SP - 427
EP - 452
JO - International Interactions
JF - International Interactions
SN - 0305-0629
IS - 3
ER -