International Signaling and Economic Sanctions

Taehee Whang, Hannah June Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state’s resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)427-452
Number of pages26
JournalInternational Interactions
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 May 27

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations

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