Judge’s gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts: an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Chulyoung Kim

doi:10.1007/s10657-018-9590-y

Judge’s gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts: an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Chulyoung Kim

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Following its landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court allows federal judges to dismiss cases when the plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory or implausible, thereby increasing the judges’ discretionary power in pleading stages of litigation. Using a stylized litigation model, I find the conditions under which the ruling improves upon litigation outcomes by simultaneously raising deterrence and reducing litigation costs and error costs. In particular, I demonstrate the ways in which the ruling’s effect depends on the correlation between the potential injurers’ primary behavior and the strength of cases filed at trial courts.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	39-66
Number of pages	28
Journal	European Journal of Law and Economics
Volume	46
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9590-y
Publication status	Published - 2018 Aug 1

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgements I’m grateful to Dongryul Lee, two anonymous referees, and participants in various conferences for their valuable comments. All remaining errors are my own. This work was supported by the Yonsei University Future-leading Research Initiative of 2017 (2017-22-0123).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Business and International Management
Economics and Econometrics
Law

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10.1007/s10657-018-9590-y

Cite this

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abstract = "Following its landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court allows federal judges to dismiss cases when the plaintiff{\textquoteright}s allegations are conclusory or implausible, thereby increasing the judges{\textquoteright} discretionary power in pleading stages of litigation. Using a stylized litigation model, I find the conditions under which the ruling improves upon litigation outcomes by simultaneously raising deterrence and reducing litigation costs and error costs. In particular, I demonstrate the ways in which the ruling{\textquoteright}s effect depends on the correlation between the potential injurers{\textquoteright} primary behavior and the strength of cases filed at trial courts.",

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Judge’s gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts: an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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