Knowing one's future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating

Muhammet A. Bas, Curtis S. Signorino, Taehee Whang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, ρ, which denotes the correlation between two agents' private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where ρ=0 and ρ=1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < ρ < 1, a class of games which have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to estimate ρ, as well as parameters associated with utilities.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-34
Number of pages32
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume26
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

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Knowing one's future preferences : A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating. / Bas, Muhammet A.; Signorino, Curtis S.; Whang, Taehee.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1, 01.01.2014, p. 3-34.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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