Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement

Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus, explore antitrust spillovers, the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)987-1022
Number of pages36
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume61
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Dec

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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