Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges

Jay Pil Choi, Doh Shin Jeon, Byung Cheol Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider (CP)'s investment incentives to enhance its quality of services in content delivery to end users. We find that the effects crucially depend on whether the CP's entry is constrained by the Internet service provider's network capacity. If the capacity is relatively large, the prioritization reduces the investment as CP's investment and prioritization form substitutes. With limited capacity, however, they become complements and the prioritization can facilitate the entry of congestion-sensitive content. Our analysis suggests that the optimal policy may call for potentially asymmetric regulations across mobile and fixed networks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)172-204
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume66
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Mar 1

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Innovation
Net neutrality
Prioritization
Bandwidth
Investment incentives
Congestion
End users
Substitute
Optimal policy
ISP/Internet service provider
Quality of service

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Choi, Jay Pil ; Jeon, Doh Shin ; Kim, Byung Cheol. / Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges. In: Journal of Industrial Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 66, No. 1. pp. 172-204.
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Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges. / Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh Shin; Kim, Byung Cheol.

In: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 66, No. 1, 01.03.2018, p. 172-204.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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